lundi 28 mars 2011

After the meltdown: Regulating the financial markets by Yvan Allaire

Prof. Yvan Allaire
The financial crisis of 2007-08 has generated new rules, regulations and guidelines to cope with the flaws and faults of the international financial system. What kind of regulatory context is likely to evolve from this massive effort? Will it be sufficient to prevent the next bubble and crisis? Or is this only a political operation to placate an angry population? Clearly, the sum total of new rules and regulations once fully implemented would prevent a crisis of the same form and nature as the last one. But will it prevent the next one? That is the question.

Read the full article of Yvan Allaire on "Options Politiques" !

Daniel Daianu: Ce lipseste Europactului

Ultima reuniune la nivel inalt a Consiliului European a fost marcata de caderea guvernului in Portugalia, care complica procesul de acordare a asistentei financiare pentru aceasta tara (chiar daca la Lisabona nu se admite inca necesitatea). Germania si-a impus punctul de vedere privind Pactul Euro plus (fost Pactul pentru Competitivitate), care se intalneste cu propuneri anterioare formulate de Comisie si echipa de lucru condusa de presedintele Herman van Rompuy in cursului anului 2010. Ma refer la un pact de stabilitate si crestere mult intarit (inclusiv prin impunere de sanctiuni), coordonarea de politici economice generale (nu numai bugetare) si validarea unui mecanism de stabilitate financiara, care sa prevada acordarea de asistenta in anumite circumstante. Dar, in opinia mea, el nu lamureste si nu raspunde (inca) la chestiuni majore.

jeudi 17 mars 2011

Cele patru profeţii ale Guvernului şi câteva întrebări pe marginea lor

Victoria Stoiciu
Ce ar mai putea fi spus acum, în ceasul al doisprezecelea, despre noul Cod al Muncii ? Zarurile au fost aruncate. În pofida gravităţii modificărilor operate, reacţia societăţii civile, a sindicatelor nu fost foarte convingătoare. Câteva proteste organizate ici colo de către grupuri de sindicalişti, spectrul unei moţiuni de cenzură ce se anunţa din start perdantă (vom vedea azi), plus câteva critici punctuale, dar limitate ca impact prin mass media– cam astea au fost în mare problemele pe care a trebuit să le înfrunte Guvernul. Floare la ureche, cum s-ar spune…

Citeste tot articolul pe !

jeudi 10 mars 2011

Limits of openness

Limits of openness

Author : Daniel Daianu
By Daniel Daianu, former MEP and former finance minister of Romania

The current world financial crisis compels to deep soul searching and scrutiny of where top politicians and their advisers were wrong. Never mind that stern warnings on the incoming crisis were made by astute economists and financiers years ago. Unfortunately, vested interests prevailed over the cautionary words of Warren Buffett, Edward Gramlich, Alexander Lamfalussy, Paul Volcker and others. This crisis underlines pitfalls and dangers of financial deregulation (lack of regulation) in global markets and raises fundamental issues for public governance; it should be seen in conjunction with the resounding fracas of the Doha trade round, with the resurrection of economic nationalism in industrialized economies, which is not of recent vintage, and not least with geopolitical consequences of the economic rise of China and other emerging global powers. This crisis should be judged against the backdrop of the effects of climate change, of the mounting fear about nearing limits of exhaustible resources —which raises huge security concerns.

Arguably, the coming to grips with the effects of this financial and economic crisis, together with food, environment, drinking water and energy-related concerns forces national governments to reassess the advantages of unrestrained economic openness; systemic risks, not only of a financial nature, will increasingly be a focus of public agenda in the years to come. This reassessment involves more government presence in the economy as well as broader regulatory frameworks; some of it is prompted by the exceptional circumstances of the crisis, but the whole context is undergoing a change of zeitgeist and policy paradigm.

What went wrong

During the last decades rapid technological change has reduced transportation and transaction (information) costs enormously and has speeded up the transfer of know-how, albeit in a highly skewed manner, among regions of the world; the internet connects hundreds of millions of people instantaneously nowadays. World trade has expanded at a very rapid pace and broadened the scope of choice for individuals throughout the world. The collapse of communism has expanded the work of market forces and democracy in a large area of the world. And the very dynamic of the EU can be seen as an alter ego of globalisation on a regional scale.

However, we are now in the midst of the deepest financial crisis after the Great Depression, which has erupted after a sequence of other episodes of crisis in the US and Europe during the last couple of decades; this indicates the increasing instability of the world financial system —as it has evolved during recent decades. Likewise, financial and currency crises have been recurrent in emerging markets in the same period of time and have caused economic and social havoc in not a few countries, while world trade liberalisation has left many poor countries in the dust. The distribution of wealth in the world seems to be more unequal nowadays than 20 years ago; the myth of the "new economy" dissipated and corporate scandals in the affluent world show that cronyism and bad governance are a more complex phenomenon than is usually assumed and ascribed geographically; social fragmentation and exclusion have been rising both in rich and poor countries; there is a sense of disorder and a rising tide of discontent and frustration in many parts of the world. Can we make some sense of all this in relation with policy dynamics?

The past two decades have been suffused with claims that economic policy, in the advanced countries, is bring driven by an emerging new consensus on principles and practice. One origin of this "consensus" could be ascribed to the ever longing desire of Man to control his environment and be more efficient. Max Weber’s “rationalization of life” referred to rational accounting, rational law, rational technology, which by extrapolation, can be extended to “rational economics”. Daniel Bell upheld the primacy of knowledge and theory-related activities in ordering our life, man’s technological and economic ascendancy — which would imply that economic wizards can secure a fool-proof policy. Even the clash between keynesism and monetarism, as the two main competing macro-economic paradigms, could be seen in the vein of searching the ultimate piece of wisdom. Another origin of policy amalgamation came out of the death of communism. Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” was seen by many as an embodiment of a, presumably, single cosmology which was meant to rule the world. At that time Reagan's and Thatcher's revolutions were in full swing in the US and the UK, respectively. The fall of communism favoured immensely the advance of neo-liberal ideas. Internationally this dynamic was reflected by the expansion of global markets, globalization. “The world is flat”, to use Thomas Friedman´s sintagma, became synonymous with economic development reaching out to all corners of the earth provided adequate policies are put in place. By adequate policies one understood, mostly, the Washington Consensus., which encapsulated policies and practices advocated by IFIs.

Needless to say that the overwhelming superiority of the US on all fronts (economic, military, technological), offered a sui generis Pax Americana and created prerequisites for an international regime. The latter was supposed to order the world by providing international public goods, a widely embraced vision, and resolving/preventing possibly major conflicts.
But economics as a hard science is only a dream, while market fundamentalism has revealed its serious weaknesses over time, and its coup de grace is, arguably, the current financial and economic crisis. It is true that liberalization and extensive privatization did transform post-communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe and allowed most of them to join the EU. But their case is quite unique owing to geography, cultural and political consciousness, and considerable support from the US and Western Europe. It is also true that market-oriented reforms have unfettered entrepreneurship and have stimulated economic growth in China after 1978, and in India during the last decade, but those reforms have been implemented in a pragmatic way, with a close attention paid to social issues and rural development problems, while financial and trade markets have not been liberalized recklessly.

The interpretation of liberalization/globalisation, which I mention above, puts emphasis on unbridled markets, privatisation (of public utilities too) and downsizing of the public sector to the utmost. This philosophy has widened to international markets - finance and trade - and the IFIs have often championed it. Let me give an example. The IMF and the World Bank advocated capital account liberalization worldwide, and South Korea’s entry in the OECD was preconditioned by its capital account opening As many accept nowadays the Asian crisis, of a decade ago, was caused, primarily, by a premature opening of the capital account in the economies of that region.

Reinterpreting globalisation

But globalisation (and liberalisation) can be understood in a different vein, which looks at the actual functioning of global markets - with their pluses and minuses - and which takes into account insights of economic theory such as informational asymmetries, increasing returns (while technological progress is intense —endogenous growth), agglomeration effects (clusters), multiple (bad) equilibria, coordination failures, the role of economic geography, and so on. As these theoretical constructs and, a fortiori, the effects of the current financial crisis suggest, there are lessons to learn: the need for effective regulation of markets; the role of the state in providing public goods; the role of institutions (structures of governance); the need of public goods and effective governance in the world economy; the importance of variety and policy ownership in policy-making.

To some, this interpretation of globalisation may sow seeds of confusion. But, in this way, one can dispel a biased interpretation of it. By the way, I have always been baffled by the language used by some media when describing market-friendly reforms. Is a rescue package, like the ones destined currently to help banking sectors get out of trouble, against the logic of a market economy? For a market fundamentalist it may be, but for those who, while acknowledging governments failures, see market failures as well, the need for intervention—in order to prevent a meltdown, a terrible crisis—gets another connotation, which is not inimical to market economics. Similarly, is a Keynesian approach in policy-making not market-friendly? And I could continue along this line of reasoning. Moreover, globalisation would no longer be assigned an ideological mantra and one-sided policy implications. Instead, it becomes an open-ended concept, which purports to define the mutual "opening" of societies, under the impetus of technological change and the manifold quest for economic progress. Such an opening should be pragmatic and flexible. By flexibility one can imply policy reversals as a function of changing circumstances —be they in the realm of trade, finance, industrial policy, etc. Moreover, such an interpretation rids itself of a perceived West-centered origin. Such an unconstrained interpretation of globalisation would have major repercussions for national public policies and international politics.

Thus, national public policies could be fairly pragmatic, varied and geared towards the traditional goals of economic growth, price stability and social justice. There is no modern economy that does not blend the public and the private spheres. Some could say that too much variety in institutional and policy design would damage a level playing field and impede markets to function effectively. And there is truth in this argument, but which is one-sided. For it underplays the importance of working out policies that keep in mind the extreme diversity of conditions in the world economy and the fact that market forces do not bring convergence automatically. As a matter of fact they may even increase discrepancies, as they often do, because of cumulative causation processes. And if we add here the inexistence of a world government, which should try to do what the EU tries to achieve via its cohesion policy inescapable conclusions come to the fore (just keep in mind the abysmal results of the Millenium Agenda). Let me focus now on finance and trade as fields which relate national economies to each other and where policy reassessments seem to be in the making.

As the current crisis amply shows one of Keynes' intellectual legacies, which is enshrined in the Bretton Woods arrangements —namely, that highly volatile capital flows are inimical to trade and prosperity—has not lost relevance. For decades now a mantra has been heard worldwide: that not much can be done in national policy-making because global markets would punish a government. But is the complexion of global markets God given? Are n't global markets, aside from their technological drivers, also the product of human beings' decisions to set rules for finance, trade and investment. The argument that we should not turn the clock back may be right in the sense that open systems bring benefits and should be protected as much as possible. And here Pascal Lamy’s and other top international public servants’ worries are well founded. But to claim that nothing can be done about financial flows, when they bring about misery, is unconvincing. Can the parallel banking sector (including hedge funds and private equity funds) be regulated? Definitely, it can! Can we restrain leverage in finance? Sure we can. Can we forbid short-selling if the need arises? Certainly we can. Can we regulate rating agencies? Sure we can. Can we impose capital account restrictions in case of need, though one has to think about regulatory arbitrage? Sure we can. Those who say that it is hard to fetter capital movements in our times have a point, but not a peremptory one. Likewise, the argument that financial innovation should be unchecked sounds hollow in view of the toxicity of many of its products. For not all financial innovation is sound.

Free trade as a headline will continue to be paid lip service worldwide but, in the years to come trade patterns will likely be reexamined owing to growing security concerns of national states. One type of concerns originates in the costs of adjustment to competitive pressures. In a global economy where win-lose situations are not rare and in which currently leading economies can be on the losing side trade and investment restrictions, more or less subtle, would be resorted to. The are seminal studies (of Paul Krugman, Elhanan Helpman, Herschel Grossman, etc) which show that industrial, investment and trade policies can make a difference, for the better, for those which practice them. And western countries may try to use them in order to protect their competitive edges in the world economy. Le doyen of world economists, Paul Samuelson, also contributed to this debate ( Journal of Economic Perspectives: “ Where Ricardo and Mill rebut and confirm arguments of mainstream economists supporting globalization”, no.3/2004, pp.135-147). Other type of concerns relate to “hard security”. "Trading with the rival" worries may lead to the imposition of restrictions —very much in the vein of the old COCOM norms (which operated during the Cold War). Likewise, would the US, or major EU member states accept big chunks of their most sensitive manufacturing and IT sectors being acquired by Chinese, or Russian companies (or SWFs belonging to these countries)? Trade restrictions may pop up also due to the thinking that it pays not to rely too much on overseas suppliers regarding basic food. Climate change could also force governments to see indigenous farming as a way to protect the local habitat, which may filter down a narrowly defined rationalization of trade flows dramatically. The security and the cost of managing networks would also come increasingly into the picture —terrorism being a factor here too. We may think globally, but be forced, owing to various risk-related considerations, to limit ourselves to what are perceived as safer patterns of trade and production. In this way one can think of an optimal trade openness. Ironically, managed openness may be better for competition to the extent unrestrained liberalization leads to the formation of a few giant global companies in various fields (the current financial crisis favors big groups which can swallow weaker competitors)

This myriad of concerns could also stimulate the formation of alliances (trade and not only) among groups of countries that share common interests. The EU is already such a bloc. A transatlantic trade area could also emerge. We could see a replica of it in Asia, though the rivalry between China, India and Japan will be a big handicap in this respect. But keep in mind that there was talk about setting up a monetary union in the wake of the Asian crisis and such a proposal may come into being in the end. And if the yuan turns into a reserve currency the rationale for creating an Asian monetary area would grow.

How would the EU evolve in this world context? The logic of single markets would continue to dominate but policy-making will be quite nuanced at national level. There will be more regulation of financial markets, both at national and EU (MU) level. National governments will be more active in the economy. By activism I think of efforts to support sectors and companies that are deemed essential for national security. As long as the EU will not develop a common foreign and security policy, which should be supported by a larger collective budget as well, national governments will not give up what they see as vital for their security. Therefore the EU will continue to have a pretty complicated policy-making structure, while variable geometry will likely be on the rise.

Barriers to unrestrained free world trade, investment and finance would also stem from the global system getting multipolar. The effects of the current financial crisis have hit the western world at a time when tectonic shifts in the global economy had been taking place for more then a decade. The rise of China, India, Brazil, the resuscitation of a capitalist Russia (that benefits on huge natural resources) are ushering in an increasingly multi-polar world, with growing reverberations economically and geopolitically. The rise of sovereign wealth funds, which are heavily concentrated in Asia and the Gulf region illustrates the shifting balance of power in the world. The struggle for the control of exhaustible resources (oil and gas in particular) epitomizes this phenomenon.

Who would formulate and enforce a suitable international regime for the 21st century? On its own the US does not have this capacity any longer. And I hardly see the EU taking over such a role. If EU member states have such a hard time in seeing eye to eye when dealing with the causes of the financial crisis (ex: the British opposition to more regulation of the financial markets, as against the French and German view) think about insurmountable problems at the international level —where Realpolitik considerations play a critical role. Besides, in a multi-polar world the establishment of an international regime is a very complicated affair. The IFIs, the international architecture need to be reformed. But their reform hinges on what the main international actors wish to do in this respect and on how they relate to each other. That G20 seems to take the place of G8 is not a sufficient ground for optimism in this regard. Nevertheless, I dare to believe that if the US, the EU, and the emerging global powers (China, India, Russia, etc) can strike a deal to this end other significant players would come along eventually.

To conclude: I submit that a combination of two dynamics will develop as a means to preserve an open global economic system, be it in a looser form. One dynamic refers to a partial domestication of market forces in national governments’ quest to cope with systemic risks and social strain. This would involve more state presence in the economy (state capitalism) and broader regulations; elements of “war economy” conduct in public policy will also be quite visible, in liberal democracies too (a thesis I have argued about in a previous article of mine in Europesworld, and which is illustrated glaringly by how governments in the western world have reacted to the effects of this financial crisis). I should say that ideological propensities are less involved here, for governments act, basically, out of sheer necessity. The other dynamic refers to blocs of countries that decide to use a common currency and trade more intensively among themselves; such arrangements would be a means to avoid brutal disruptions to their internal activities were a global crisis occur. This is like saying that the global system needs several sub-global clusters in order to mitigate the potentially devastating effects of a completely open world system that would be prone to recurring major crises. The latter state of a global system being, in reality, unsustainable because of its unavoidable motion toward an eventual breakdown and proliferating fragmentation effects. About a decade ago Dani Rodrik, who is one of the most insightful development economists remarked that not any globalization is good for poor countries (The new global economy and developing countries. Making openness work, Washington DC, Overseas Development Council, 1998). I would paraphrase him and say that openness has to be made to work for the world as a whole, which implies shedding the blind belief in the self-healing and self-regulatory virtues of markets.

Pentru un capitalism al proprietarilor

Pentru un capitalism al proprietarilor

Acad. Prof. dr. Yvan Allaire, preşedinte al Institutului pentru guvernanţa organizaţiilor private şi publice (IGOPP) -Canada
Prof. dr. Mihaela Fîrşirotu, profesor de strategie la Şcoala de ştiinţe ale gestiunii, UQÀM-Canada

(Parerile exprimate in acest articol ii reprezinta exclusiv pe autori)

Cu cei circa 2 000 de lideri politici şi economici reuniţi, pentru două sau trei zile la fiecare sfârşit de ianuarie, sătucul elveţian Davos devine o chintesenţă a umorilor „elitei“ mondiale, un barometru al influenţei schimbătoare a naţiunilor.

Optimismul de paradă al reprezentanţilor occidentali ascundea o profundă nelinişte, teama de o fractură socială. Unii simţeau deja răsuflarea îngheţată, frisonul vestitor al crizelor sociale alimentate de rata şomajului înaltă şi tenace, mai ales printre tineri, de inegalităţile crescânde dintre cetăţeni în privinţa bunăstării, de deprimanta creştere a preţului produselor alimentare, de dificila integrare a emigranţilor şi de eşecul multiculturalismului, de consecinţele sociale şi economice ale măsurilor de austeritate fiscală adoptate de aproape toate ţările dezvoltate şi mai puţin dezvoltate.

Cuplul nepereche Merkel-Sarkozy a făcut la Davos declaraţii solemne de susţinere a monedei euro, dorind să-i tempereze pe speculatori. Şi totuşi, nimeni nu e chiar atât de naiv; Germania va cere ca ansamblul ţărilor Uniunii Europene să adopte politici fiscale, sociale şi economice dure şi precise pentru a obţine sprijinul său financiar.

La Davos 2011 s-au făcut simţite, aproape fizic, o deplasare a puterii economice dinspre Occident către Orient, ca şi desuetudinea modelului economic american şi dominaţia germană asupra Uniunii Europene.
Evident, toanele se schimbă rapid; ţări influente azi sunt lipsite de importanţă mâine şi viceversa. Şi totuşi, nimeni nu a îndrăznit să pună sub semnul îndoielii ascensiunea Chinei şi a Indiei sau rolul decisiv pe care aceste uriaşe ţări îl vor juca în următoarele decenii.

Schimbarea mizei economice

Aceste ţări joacă pe terenul economic după reguli diferite, îşi sprijină dezvoltarea pe reguli economice proprii, adeseori necunoscute în Occident, rivalizează cu economiile occidentale prin intermediul unor întreprinderi aflate adesea în proprietatea statului sau controlate de acesta.
India, de pildă, are numeroase societăţi de stat iar întreprinderile indiene cotate la bursă emit aproape întotdeauna „acţiuni ale promotorului“ care lasă controlul în mâinile fondatorilor şi ale familiilor acestora. De fapt, doar 15% dintre acţiunile societăţilor indiene cotate la bursă sunt deţinute de investitori straini. Guvernul indian a adoptat recent o lege care obligă la sporirea acestui prag la 25% în următorii trei-cinci ani.
Într-adevăr, în societăţi total diferite precum Norvegia, Finlanda, Brazilia, Rusia, India şi China, societăţile de stat sau controlate de stat deţin participări importante în sectoarele nevralgice ale resurselor naturale, băncilor şi telecomunicaţiilor. Rareori aceste guverne îşi lasă societăţile de importanţă strategică vulnerabile la preluarea controlului de către interese străine.

Aceste guverne adoptă tot mai frecvent o formă hibridă de intreprindere de stat. Guvernul păstrează controlul asupra societăţii (sau cel puţin asupra unei minorităţi de blocaj) dar cotează societatea la bursă şi îi deschide capitalul către investitori privaţi. În felul acesta, societatea are acces la surse de capital privat pentru a-şi finanţa dezvoltarea şi beneficiază, în cazurile cele mai fericite, de disciplina în guvernanţă, de transparenţa şi de măsurile de performanţă impuse de cotarea întreprinderii la bursă.
La sfârşitul lui 2010, din primele zece societăţi cu cea mai mare valoare la bursă la nivel mondial, patru erau societăţi hibride de stat cu sediul în China, Rusia şi Brazilia, cu activităţi în domeniul energiei.

Modelul „american“ de întreprindere

Or, modelul tipic „american“ de întreprindere cotată la bursă riscă să nu poată face faţă acestei noi rivalităţi, fiind prea orientat spre performanţa pe termen scurt, prea usor de busculat de nerabdarea „investitorilor“ avizi, dornici de randament rapid şi de cresterea preţului acţiunilor. Aceste firme „model“ sunt prăzi uşoare, miei sacrificaţi pe altarul pieţelor financiare şi al operatorilor şi speculatorilor de toate felurile. Sub presiunea investitorilor nerăbdători şi a atacurilor (reale sau bănuite) ale vânzătorilor de actiuni neposedate ,dar imprumutate si vandute in scopul speculatiei (short-selling) şi ale fondurilor speculative (numite în mod fals hedge funds, adica fonduri de acoperire a riscului), conducătorii acestor firme „model”, bine remuneraţi tocmai pentru a nu opune prea mare rezistenţă, nu mai administrează decât pe termen scurt şi se consacră exclusiv măsurilor destinate a susţine creşterea profitului pe acţiune şi astfel a cotaţiei la bursă.
Nu numai că întreprinderile de acest tip vor suferi din cauza lipsei de viziune pe termen lung şi de tenacitate în competiţia cu întreprinderile venite de aiurea, dar, în plus, ele constituie un model de întreprindere cât se poate de nepotrivit pentru a i se încredinţa dezvoltarea optimă a resurselor naturale ale unei ţări. În Canada, în pofida efortului susţinut din unele medii pentru a promova, chiar a impune acest „model“ american, trama industrială canadiană comportă un mare număr de campioni industriali cu acţionari în poziţie de control, adesea prin intermediul unor acţiuni care dau dreptul la vot multiplu, sau chiar societăţi de stat, societăţi integral private sau cooperative.
Tabelul următor arată distribuţia primelor 100 de mari societăţi comerciale canadiene în 2008. Doar 41 de societăţi au un acţionariat dispersat( adica nimeni nu detine mai mult de 5%-10% din actiunile cu drept de vot); dar chiar şi în cazul lor, multe sunt bănci şi societăţi de asigurări, ferite prin reglementare de preluarea controlului de către terţi, fie ei autohtoni sau straini.In schimb, in Statele Unite, cel puţin 70 din primele 100 de societăţi comerciale sunt construite după modelul societăţii cu proprietari difuzi.
Majoritatea firmelor implicate in criza financiara din 2007-2008 erau exact de acest fel!

Sursa: date din Financial Post, compilate de autori

– Societăţi de stat 13
– Proprietate privată 11
– Filiale ale unor societăţi străine 13
– Cooperative 3
– Societăţi cotate la bursă sub controlul unei categorii speciale de acţiuni 12
– Societăţi cotate la bursă cu acţionariat de control 7
– Societăţi cotate la bursă cu acţionariat difuz 41

Copyright, 2009-2010, Allaire şi Fîrşirotu.
Toate drepturile de reproducere sau adaptare totală sau parţială rezervate.

Nu trebuie să ne lăsăm influenţaţi de ideologii şi de alte voci interesate care încearcă să culpabilizeze intreprinderile care nu se conformează viziunii lor despre „intreprinderea comercială ideală“.


Aşa cum am propus la Davos, trebuie să îndemnăm guvernele să favorizeze şi să promoveze o mare diversitate de forme de proprietate pentru întreprinderile lor: de la întreprinderea care rămâne privată 100% până la cooperative, de la întreprinderea cotată la bursă cu acţiuni care dau deobicei fondatorului-entrepreneur al firmei, dreptul la un vot superior procentului de actiuni detinute , (de exemplu 10 voturi pentru ficare actiune detinuta (multiple –vote shares),ceea ce asigura controlul asupra companiei, până la societăţi de stat pure sau hibride, de la firme de familie la afaceri în parteneriat.
În ceea ce priveşte întreprinderea de tip clasic, cu acţionariat dispersat, propunem măsuri menite a fideliza acţionariatul şi a face conducătorii acestui tip de întreprinderi mai puţin sensibili la toanele „investitorilor“ pe termen scurt şi la atacurile speculatorilor, cum ar fi: dreptul de vot să nu fie acordat decât după un an de la cumpărarea acţiunilor; întreprinderea ar putea acorda dividende majorate după o anumită perioadă de deţinere a acţiunilor; guvernele ar putea schimba regulile fiscale în sensul ca taxele pe câştigurile de capital să descreasca in funcţie de lungimea perioadei de deţinere a acţiunilor etc.
În felul acesta se construieşte un capitalism al adevăraţilor proprietari!

22 februarie 2011

Aricolul va fi publicat in franceza in martie 2011,in Revista Forces-Montreal, Canada

lundi 7 mars 2011

Îmbunătăţiţi performanţa întreprinderilor de stat prin guvernanţă corporativă

Privatizările şi dereglementările pe scară largă, inspirate de ideologia prevalentă în epoca Reagan-Thatcher, au produs rezultate amestecate. Chiar în circumstanţele cele mai favorabile, ca în cazul Marii Britanii, rezultatele au fost dezamăgitoare şi s-au soldat cu mai multe eşecuri.

Citeste articolul pe Ziarul Financiar.